Showing 1 - 10 of 22
We consider a two-stage principal-agent model with limited liability in which a CEO is employed as agent to gather information about suitable merger targets and to manage the merged corporation in case of an acquisition. Our results show that the CEO systematically recommends targets with low...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011430291
We consider a two-stage principal-agent model with limited liability in which a CEO is employed as agent to gather information about suitable merger targets and to manage the merged corporation in case of an acquisition. Our results show that the CEO systematically recommends targets with low...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010340013
We consider a two-stage principal-agent model with limited liability in which a CEO is employed as agent to gather information about suitable merger targets and to manage the merged corporation in case of an acquisition. Our results show that the CEO systematically recommends targets with low...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198514
In this study, we enrich a standard principal-agent model with hidden action by introducing salience-biased perception on the agent's side. The agent's misguided focus on salient payoffs, which leads the agent's and the principal's probability assessments to diverge, has two effects: First, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013172380
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011487505
We modify the principal-agent model with moral hazard by assuming that the agent is expectation-based loss averse according to Köszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). The optimal contract is a binary payment scheme even for a rich performance measure, where standard preferences predict a fully...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008662594
This paper analyses the welfare effects of microfinance and inflation in developing countries. Therefore, we introduce a moral hazard problem into a monetary search model with money and credit. We show how access to basic financial services affects households' decisions to borrow, to save and to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009772193
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008772349
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009235712
This paper extends the standard principal-agent model with moral hazard to allow for agents having reference-dependent preferences according to Köszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). The main finding is that loss aversion leads to fairly simple contracts. In particular, when shifting the focus from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003782366