We examine the strategic behavior of leaders and followers in sequential duopoly experiments in which followers either perfectly observe the leaders’ actions or else observe nothing. Our experiments show that consistent with the theory, leaders enjoy a greater …rst-mover advantage when...

We examine the strategic behavior of first and second movers in a two party bargaining game with uncertain information transmission. When the first mover states her demand she does only know the probability with which the second mover will be informed about it. If the second mover is informed,...

We examine the strategic behavior of first and second movers in a two party bargaining game with uncertain information transmission. When the first mover states her demand she does only know the probability with which the second mover will be informed about it. If the second mover is informed,...

We examine the strategic behavior of leaders and followers in sequential duopoly experimentsin which followers either perfectly observe the leaders’ actions or else observe nothing. Ourexperiments show that consistent with the theory, leaders enjoy a greater first-mover advantagewhen followers...

The common prior assumption is pervasive in game-theoretic models with incomplete information. This paper investigates experimentally the importance of inducing a common prior in a two-person signaling game. For a specific probability distribution of the sender's type, the long-run behavior...

The common prior assumption is pervasive in game-theoretic models with incomplete information. This paper investigates experimentally the importance of inducing a common prior in a two-person signaling game. For a specific probability distribution of the sender’s type, the long-run behavior...

This note contributes to the discussion of decision problems with imperfect recall from an empirical point of view. We argue that, using standard methods of experimental economics, it is impossible to induce (or control for) absent-mindedness of subjects. Nevertheless, it is possible to test...

We examine the behavior of senders and receivers in the context of oligopoly limit pricing experiments in which high prices chosen by two privately informed incumbents may signal to a potential entrant that the industry-wide costs are high and that entry is unprofitable. The results provide...

In this paper we provide textual evidence on the sophistication of medieval deterrence strategies. Drawing on one of the great opera librettos based on medieval sources, Wagner's Tannhäuser, we shall illustrate the use of optimal randomization strategies that can be derived by applying notions...

In this study behavior in a Cournot duopoly with two production periods (the market clears only after the second period) is compared to behavior in a standard one-period Cournot duopoly. Theory predicts the endogenous emergence of a Stackelberg outcome in the two-period market. The results of...