In a horizontal product differentiation model, we show conditions under which Cournot competition (which implies some form of price coordination) allows a larger number of firms to operate in the industry than Bertrand competition. In turn, total welfare is higher under Cournot than under...

When two countries starting from different quality levels (reflecting different conditions on domestic market demands) open to trade, two possible equilibria arise. In the first one, the quality leader maintains its position. In the second, leapfrogging occurs. However, the latter is possible...

D'Aspremont and Jacquemin's (1988) model is extended to study alternative configurations of research agreements. Analogies with the cartel literature are found: under certain conditions on spillover values, outsiders benefit more than participants in R&D agreements. If cooperative spillovers are...

This paper models a sequential merger formation game with endogenous efficiency gains in which every merger has to be submitted for approval to the Antitrust Authority (AA). Two different types of AA are studied: first a myopic AA, which judges a given merger without considering that subsequent...