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Coalition-proof risk sharing under frictions

Krueger, Dirk; Cole, Harold L.; Mailath, George J.; … - 2020

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012200939

Coalition-proof risk sharing under frictions

Cole, Harold L.; Krueger, Dirk; Mailath, George J.; … - 2020

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012183893

Social capital: a double-edged sword

Cole, Harold L.; Krueger, Dirk; Mailath, George J.; … - 2021

We analyze efficient risk-sharing arrangements when coalitions may deviate. Coalitions form to insure against … idiosyncratic income risk. Self-enforcing contracts for both the original coalition and any deviating coalition rely on a belief in … coalitions, the extent of risk sharing in successfully formed coalitions is declining in the extent of social capital and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012438417

Trust in risk sharing : a double-edged sword

Cole, Harold L.; Krueger, Dirk; Mailath, George J.; … - 2022

We analyze efficient risk-sharing arrangements when the value from deviating is determined endogenously by another risk … sharing arrangement. Coalitions form to insure against idiosyncratic income risk. Self-enforcing contracts for both the … facilitates the initial formation of coalitions, the extent of risk sharing in successfully formed coalitions is declining in the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013555532

Trust in risk sharing : a double-edged sword

Cole, Harold L.; Krueger, Dirk; Mailath, George J.; … - In: The review of economic studies : RES 91 (2024) 3, pp. 1448-1497

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014528698

Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability: New Results and Classic Applications

Mailath, George J.; Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig von - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2010

This note provides several generalizations of Mailath's (1987) result that incentive compatibility plus separation implies differentiability. The new results extend the theory to classic models in finance such as Leland and Pyle (1977), Glosten (1989), and De Marzo and Duffie (1999), that were...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008672484

Reputations in Repeated Games, Second Version

Mailath, George J.; Samuelson, Larry - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2013

This paper, prepared for the Handbook of Game Theory, volume 4 (Peyton Young and Shmuel Zamir, editors, Elsevier Press), surveys work on reputations in repeated games of incomplete information.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010685964

Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability New Results and Classic Applications

Mailath, George J.; Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig von - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

We provide several generalizations of Mailath's (1987) result that in games of asymmetric information with a continuum of types incentive compatibility plus separation implies differentiability of the informed agent's strategy. The new results extend the theory to classic models in finance such...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010737648

Incentive compatibility and differentiability: New results and classic applications

Mailath, George J.; von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig - In: Journal of Economic Theory 148 (2013) 5, pp. 1841-1861

We provide several generalizations of Mailathʼs (1987) [9] result that in games of asymmetric information with a continuum of types incentive compatibility plus separation implies differentiability of the informed agentʼs strategy. The new results extend the theory to classic models in finance...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011043042

When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime

Mailath, George J.; Nocke, Volker; White, Lucy - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2015

In repeated normal-form (simultaneous-move) games, simple penal codes (Abreu, 1986, 1988) permit an elegant characterization of the set of subgame-perfect outcomes. We show that the logic of simple penal codes fails in repeated extensive-form games. By means of examples, we identify two types of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011170302