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Cole, Harold L.; Krueger, Dirk; Mailath, George J.; … - 2021

idiosyncratic income risk. Self-enforcing contracts for both the original coalition and any deviating coalition rely on a belief in … original as well as a deviating coalition. As a consequence, although social capital facilitates the initial formation of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012438417

Coalition-proof risk sharing under frictions

Cole, Harold L.; Krueger, Dirk; Mailath, George J.; … - 2020

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012183893

Trust in risk sharing : a double-edged sword

Cole, Harold L.; Krueger, Dirk; Mailath, George J.; … - 2022

original coalition and any coalition formed (joined) after deviations rely on a belief in future cooperation which we term …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013555532

Trust in risk sharing : a double-edged sword

Cole, Harold L.; Krueger, Dirk; Mailath, George J.; … - In: The review of economic studies : RES 91 (2024) 3, pp. 1448-1497

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014528698

A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games

Bhaskar, V. - 2012

We study perfect information games with an infinite horizon played by an arbitrary number of players. This class of games includes infinitely repeated perfect information games, repeated games with asynchronous moves, games with long and short run players, games with overlapping generations of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013098365