We study the general problem of information design for a policymaker—a central bank—that communicates its private information (the ``state") to the public. We show that it is optimal for the policymaker to partition the state space into a finite number of ``clusters” and to communicate to...

We solve for the equilibrium dynamics of information sharing in a large population. Each agent is endowed with signals regarding the likely outcome of a random variable of common concern. Individuals choose the effort with which they search for others from whom they can gather additional...

How does private information get incorporated into option prices? To study this question, I develop a non-linear, noisy rational expectations equilibrium model with asymmetric information and a full menu of call and put options available for trading. The model allows for an arbitrary...

Contrary to conventional wisdom in nance, return prediction R2 and optimal portfolio Sharpe ratio generally increase with model parameterization, even when minimal regularization is used. We theoretically characterize the behavior of return prediction models in the high complexity regime, i.e....

How should an agent (the sender) observing multi-dimensional data (the state vector) persuade another agent to take the desired action? We show that it is always optimal for the sender to perform a (non-linear) dimension reduction by projecting the state vector onto a lower-dimensional object...

We develop a rational model of trading behavior in which the agents gradually learn about their ability to trade, and exit after poor trading performance. We demonstrate that it is optimal for experienced traders to "procrastinate" and postpone exit even after bad results. We embed this "optimal...