We consider a Stackelberg pricing problem in directed networks:Tariffs (prices) have to be defined by an operator, the leader, for a subset of the arcs. Clients, the followers, choose paths to route their demand through the network selfishly and independently of each other, on the basis of...

We study the design of optimal mechanisms in a setting where job-agents compete for being processed by a service provider that can handle one job at a time. Each job has a processing time and incurs a waiting cost. Jobs need to be compensated for waiting. We consider two models, one where only...

The purpose of this paper is to present examples which show that deterministic and stochastic scheduling problems often have a surprisingly different behavior. In particular, it demonstrates some seemingly counterintuitive properties of optimal scheduling policies for stochastic machine...

We consider machine scheduling problems where jobs have to be processed on unrelated parallel machines in order to minimize the schedule makespan. The processing time of any job is dependent on the usage of a scarce resource that can be distributed over the jobs in process. The more of that...

The property of an allocation rule to be implementable in dominant strategies by a unique payment scheme is called revenue equivalence. In this paper we give a characterization of revenue equivalence based on a graph theoretic interpretation of the incentive compatibility constraints. The...

The highway pricing problem asks for prices to be determined for segments of a single highway such as to maximize the revenue obtainable from a given set of customers with known valuations. The problem is (weakly) NP-hard and a recent quasi-PTAS suggests that a PTAS might be in reach. Yet, so...

We consider parallel, identical machine scheduling problems where the jobs are subject to precedence constraints, release dates, and the processing times of jobs are governed by independent probability distributions. The objective is to minimize the expected value of the total weighted...

The property of an allocation rule to be implementable in dominant strategies by a unique payment scheme is called revenue equivalence. In this paper we give a characterization of revenue equivalence based on a graph theoretic interpretation of the incentive compatibility constraints. The...

We consider the problem to price (digital) items in order to maximize the revenue obtainable from a set of bidders. We suggest a natural monotonicity constraint on bundle prices, show that the problem remains NP-hard, and we derive a PTAS. We also discuss a special case, the highway pricing problem.

We consider a scheduling problem where a set of jobs is distributed over parallel machines. The processing time of any job is dependent on the usage of a scarce renewable resource, e.g., personnel. An amount of k units of that resource can be allocated to the jobs at any time, and the more of...