interface of labor market policies and public economics. Moreover, how rent seeking and corruption within the informal segment … the gap. We identify conditions under which economic reform in the formal segment will increase the rate of corruption or … reforms may increase corruption instead of reducing it, as claimed previously. …

resultant prosperity. We also emphasize that enforcing regulations is a complex task given corruption, informal markets, and the …

interface of labor market policies and public economics. Moreover, how rent seeking and corruption within the informal segment … the gap. We identify conditions under which economic reform in the formal segment will increase the rate of corruption or … reforms may increase corruption instead of reducing it, as claimed previously. …

resultant prosperity. We also emphasize that enforcing regulations is a complex task given corruption, informal markets, and the …

reform for a small open economy where bureaucratic corruption arises because of trade protection. Intermediaries are employed … which uses the intermediate good is critical in determining the extent of corruption. It is essentially a tug of war between … corruption. …

We use the HOSV model of trade to find out a link between corruption and the pattern of trade, not just its effect on … the volume of trade. We prove that greater corruption in labor-abundant countries will restrict the volume of world trade … transaction cost of corruption. Relatively corrupt economy will export capital-intensive goods. However, relatively capital …

This paper introduces "harassment" in a model of bribery and corruption. We characterize the harassment equilibrium and …

This paper introduces `harassment' in a simple model of bribery and corruption. …

This paper introduces harassment in a model of bribery and corruption. We characterize the harassment equilibrium and …