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Competition, Cooperation, and Collective Choice
Markussen, Thomas; Reuben, Ernesto; Tyran, Jean-Robert - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012
economics. This paper explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma … outcome depends strongly on specific voting rules of institutional choice. If the majority decides, competition is almost …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084279
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Self-Organization for Collective Action: An Experimental Study of Voting on Formal, Informal, and No Sanction Regimes
Markussen, Thomas; Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert - Brown University, Department of Economics - 2011
). Being adopted by voting appears to enhance the efficiency of both informal sanctions and non-deterrent formal sanctions. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008800357
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Self-Organization for Collective Action: An Experimental Study of Voting on Formal, Informal, and No Sanction Regimes
Markussen, Thomas; Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert - Økonomisk Institut, Københavns Universitet - 2011
). Being adopted by voting appears to enhance the efficiency of both informal sanctions and non-deterrent formal sanctions. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008836656
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Competition, cooperation, and collective choice
Markussen, Thomas; Reuben, Ernesto; Tyran, Jean-Robert - Økonomisk Institut, Københavns Universitet - 2012
economics. This paper explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma … outcome depends strongly on specific voting rules of institutional choice. If the majority decides, competition is almost …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011277839
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Competition, cooperation, and collective choice
Markussen, Thomas; Reuben, Ernesto; Tyran, Jean-Robert - 2012
economics. This paper explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition, which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma … outcome depends strongly on specific voting rules of institutional choice. If the majority decides, competition is almost …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010283979
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Self-Organization for collective action: An experimental study of voting on formal, informal, and no sanction regimes
Markussen, Thomas; Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert - 2011
). Being adopted by voting appears to enhance the efficiency of both informal sanctions and non-deterrent formal sanctions. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010287722
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Governing collective action in the face of observational error
Markussen, Thomas; Putterman, Louis G.; Wang, Liangjun - 2017
We present results from a repeated public goods experiment where subjects choose by vote one of two sanctioning schemes: peer-to-peer (informal) or centralized (formal). We introduce, in some treatments, a moderate amount of noise (a 10 percent probability that a contribution is reported...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012058652
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Competition, Cooperation, and Collective Choice
Markussen, Thomas; Reuben, Ernesto; Tyran, Jean-Robert - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2012
economics. This paper explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition, which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma … outcome depends strongly on specific voting rules of institutional choice. If the majority decides, competition is almost …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010754117
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Voting on sanctioning institutions in open and closed communities : experimental evidence
Cobo-Reyes, Ramón; Katz, Gabriel; Markussen, Thomas; … - 2019
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012100898
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Governing collective action in the face of observational error
Markussen, Thomas; Putterman, Louis G.; Wang, Liangjun - 2017
We present results from a repeated public goods experiment where subjects choose by vote one of two sanctioning schemes: peer-to-peer (informal) or centralized (formal). We introduce, in some treatments, a moderate amount of noise (a 10 percent probability that a contribution is reported...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011708190