Showing 1 - 10 of 10
We characterize revenue maximizing mechanisms in a common value environment where the value of the object is equal to the highest of bidders' independent signals. The optimal mechanism exhibits either neutral selection, wherein the object is randomly allocated at a price that all bidders are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011948704
We characterize revenue maximizing auctions when the bidders are intermediaries who wish to resell the good. The bidders have differential information about their common resale opportunities: each bidder privately observes an independent draw of a resale opportunity, and the highest signal is a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012949875
We characterize revenue maximizing mechanisms in a common value environment where the value of the object is equal to the highest of bidders’ independent signals. If the object is optimally sold with probability one, then the optimal mechanism is simply a posted price, with the highest...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415457
A single unit of a good is to be sold by auction to one of two buyers. The good has either a high value or a low value, with known prior probabilities. The designer of the auction knows the prior over values but is uncertain about the correct model of the buyers' beliefs. The designer evaluates...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012977350
We study auction design when bidders have a pure common value equal to the maximum of their independent signals. In the revenue maximizing mechanism, each bidder makes a payment that is independent of his signal and the allocation discriminates in favor of bidders with lower signals. We provide...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012977351
We study a linear interaction model with asymmetric information. We first characterize the linear Bayes Nash equilibrium for a class of one dimensional signals. It is then shown that this class of one dimensional signals provide a comprehensive description of the first and second moments of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012955894
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009564871
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011748103
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012098851
An action is robustly rationalizable if it is rationalizable for every type who has almost common certainty of payoffs. We illustrate by means of an example that an action may not be robustly rationalizable even if it is weakly dominant, and argue that robust rationalizability is a very...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014180335