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The Strategic Value of Quantity Forcing Contracts

Martimort, David; Piccolo, Salvatore - In: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2 (2010) 1, pp. 204-29

We explore the strategic value of quantity forcing contracts in a manufacturer-retailer environment under both adverse selection and moral hazard. Manufacturers dealing with (exclusive) competing retailers may prefer to leave contracts silent on retail prices, whenever other aspects of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008615394

Collusion and Delegation

Laffont, Jean-Jacques; Martimort, David - 1998

We discuss the internal organization of the firm, arguing that the comparison between a centralized and a decentralized hierarchical organization should be cast in terms of the agency costs associated with the different side-contracting games that agents play in these organizations. In our...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014222238

How to Design Public-Private Partnerships in a Warming World? - When Infrastructure Becomes a Really “Hot” Topic

Martimort, David; Straub, Stéphane - Maastricht School of Management (MSM) - 2011

We analyze how the deep current scientific uncertainty regarding future climate conditions affects the design of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) contracts between a government (principal) and a firm (agent), especially in infrastructure sectors that are highly sensitive to such changing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009416886

Corruption in PPPs, Incentives and Contract Incompleteness

Iossa, Elisabetta; Martimort, David - Centre for Market and Public Organisation (CMPO), … - 2014

providing for monetary compensations to the contractor when revenue shocks occur. Realized shocks are private information of the … (supervisor) has private information on contracting costs and chooses the degree of contractual incompleteness on behalf of an …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011261689

Post-Tender Corruption and Risk Allocation:Implications for Public-Private Partnerships

Iossa, Elisabetta; Martimort, David - Centro di Studi Internazionali Sull'Economia e la … - 2011

Whilst a lot has been said about how to fight corruption at tender stage in public procurement, post-tender corruption is an issue that remains almost unexplored. In this paper, we make a step towards filling this gap, by studying the relationship between the quality of a country's institutions,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009021768

A Theory of Supervision with Endogenous Transaction Costs

Faure-Grimaud, Antoine; Laffont, Jean-Jacques; … - In: Annals of Economics and Finance 1 (2000) 2, pp. 231-263

supervisor who can acquire soft information about an agent's productivity. If the supervisor were risk-neutral, the principal … optimal contract trades-off the supervisor's incentives to reveal his information with an insurance motive. This contract can … be identified with the one obtained in a simple hard information model of hierarchical collusion with exogenous …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009131591

A Mechanism Design Approach to Climate Agreements

Martimort, David; Sand-Zantman, Wilfried - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) - 2011

We analyze environmental agreements in contexts with asymmetric information, voluntary participation by sovereign …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009369354

A Mechanism Design Approach to Climate Agreements

Martimort, David; Sand-Zantman, Wilfried - Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse … - 2011

We analyze environmental agreements in contexts with asymmetric information, voluntary participation by sovereign …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009293530

Corruption in PPPs, Incentives and Contract Incompleteness

Iossa, Elisabetta; Martimort, David - Centre for Market and Public Organisation (CMPO), … - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010789917

The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector

Gagnepain, Philippe; Ivaldi, Marc; Martimort, David - In: American Economic Review 103 (2013) 6, pp. 2352-83

Contract theory claims that renegotiation prevents attainment of the efficient solution that could be obtained under full commitment. Assessing the cost of renegotiation remains an open issue from an empirical viewpoint. We fit a structural principal-agent model with renegotiation on a set of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010815474