depend on the distribution of penalties for breach between the buyer and the seller. While under complete information, the … optimal contract would remain stationary, non-stationarity might arise under asymmetric information. Enforcement constraints …

each dimension, then delegation is always strictly valuable. The principal can better extract information from the agent by … cooperation between different principals controlling various dimensions of the agentʼs activities facilitates information …

A risk averse agent gathers information on productivity shocks and produces accordingly on behalf of his principal …. Information gathering is imperfect so that the agent has either complete or no knowledge at all of those shocks. The model allows … for moral hazard in information gathering, private information on productivity shocks and moral hazard on operating effort …

. The aggregate maximand for every equilibrium includes an information-rent margin which captures the confluence of the …

depend on the distribution of penalties for breach between the buyer and the seller. While under complete information, the … optimal contract would remain stationary, non-stationarity might arise under asymmetric information. Enforcement constraints …

supervisor who can acquire soft information about an agent's productivity. If the supervisor were risk-neutral, the principal … optimal contract trades-off the supervisor's incentives to reveal his information with an insurance motive. This contract can … be identified with the one obtained in a simple hard information model of hierarchical collusion with exogenous …