supervisor who can acquire soft information about an agent's productivity. If the supervisor were risk-neutral, the principal … optimal contract trades-off the supervisor's incentives to reveal his information with an insurance motive. This contract can … be identified with the one obtained in a simple hard information model of hierarchical collusion with exogenous …

providing for monetary compensations to the contractor when revenue shocks occur. Realized shocks are private information of the … (supervisor) has private information on contracting costs and chooses the degree of contractual incompleteness on behalf of an …

providing for monetary compensations to the contractor when revenue shocks occur. Realized shocks are private information of the … (supervisor) has private information on contracting costs and chooses the degree of contractual incompleteness on behalf of an …

The provision of public goods under asymmetric information has most often been viewed as a mechanism design problem … information, instead of reducing marginal contributions to free-ride on others, principals do so to screen the agent's endogenous … private information obtained from privately observing other principals' offers. Under weak conditions, existence of a …

The provision of public goods under asymmetric information has most often been viewed as a mechanism design problem … information, instead of reducing marginal contributions to free-ride on others, principals do so to screen the agent's endogenous … private information obtained from privately observing other principals' offers. Under weak conditions, existence of a …

of the n principal's non-cooperative behavior in over-harvesting the agent's information rent. Furthermore, in any … allocation in the maximal equilibrium. Under reasonable conditions, the maximal equilibrium maximizes the agent's information …

retailer for getting information rents. Second, such restriction may provide manufacturers with strategic power in that it …

information of an intrinsic common agency game. This set of equilibria is large because of the presence of price-output offers by … offered contracts; the case of delegated agency. Second, we introduce asymmetric information in order to rationalize existing … nonlinear pricing contracts. The introduction of asymmetric information has the effect of restricting the set of equilibrium …