Similar Search Results - EconBiz

Monitoring a common agent : implications for financial contracting

Khalil, Fahad; Martimort, David; Parigi, Bruno Maria - 2005

We study the problem of multiple principals who want to obtain income from a privately informed agent and design their contracts non-cooperatively. Our analysis reveals that the degree of coordination between principals has strong implications for the shapes of contracts and the amount of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261310

Monitoring a Common Agent: Implications for Financial Contracting

Khalil, Fahad; Martimort, David; Parigi, Bruno - Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse … - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005464213

Monitoring a Common Agent: Implications for Financial Contracting

Khalil, Fahad; Martimort, David; Parigi, Bruno Maria - CESifo - 2005

We study the problem of multiple principals who want to obtain income from a privately informed agent and design their contracts non-cooperatively. Our analysis reveals that the degree of coordination between principals has strong implications for the shapes of contracts and the amount of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005181389

Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting

Khalil, Fahad; Martimort, David; Parigi, Bruno - In: Journal of Economic Theory 135 (2007) 1, pp. 35-67

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005150303

Monitoring a Common Agent: implications for financial contracting

Khalil, Fahad; Parigi, Bruno; Martimort, David - Department of Economics, University of Washington - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005685361

Monitoring a common agent : implications for financial contracting

Khalil, Fahad; Martimort, David; Parigi, Bruno - In: Journal of economic theory 135 (2007) 1, pp. 35-67

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003546373

Monitoring a common agent : implications for financial contracting

Khalil, Fahad; Martimort, David; Parigi, Bruno - 2005

We study the problem of multiple principals who want to obtain income from a privately informed agent and design their contracts non-cooperatively. Our analysis reveals that the degree of coordination between principals has strong implications for the shapes of contracts and the amount of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003147725

Monitoring a common agent : implications for financial contracting

Khalil, Fahad (contributor); Martimort, David (contributor); … - 2005

We study the problem of multiple principals who want to obtain income from a privately informed agent and design their contracts non-cooperatively. Our analysis reveals that the degree of coordination between principals has strong implications for the shapes of contracts and the amount of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003113311

Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting

Khalil, Fahad; Martimort, David; Parigi, Bruno - In: Journal of economic theory 135 (2007), pp. 35-67

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10007745879

Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting

Khalil, Fahad; Martimort, David; Parigi, Bruno - In: Journal of economic theory 135 (2007) 1, pp. 35-67

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10007752232

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