Central Bankers are currently facing big challenges in designing and implementing monetary policy, as well as with safeguarding financial stability, with the world economy still in the process of digesting the legacy of the crisis. The crisis has changed central banking in many ways: by shifting...

We empirically investigate whether central bank independence (CBI) and the monetary policy setting can jointly influence the likelihood that policymakers assign banking supervision to central banks. We find that, conditional on the government being a benevolent one, higher central bank...

By the early ‘2000 an increasing numbers of countries had adopted a well defined central bank framework, which is characterized by two intertwined features: the authority becomes specialized in achieving the monetary policy goals, and consequently its traditional responsibilities in pursuing...

In this paper bank bailout rules and central bank independence (CBI) are determined by majority voting. The failure of a bank is socially costly, since bailouts are financed by distortionary taxation. The tax distortion can be reduced via monetization, i.e. lowering CBI; but monetization causes...

The aim of this paper is to analyze the demand of both traditional and new media of exchange – as cryptocurrencies and central bank digital currencies – proposing a novel specification of the demand for money. In this specification, the medium of payment (MOP) has three properties: the first...

This paper offers a positive analysis of the relationships between central banking, macro prudential supervision and insurance, presenting three contributions. Starting from the review of the recent theoretical models, which directly or indirectly take the issue of the central bank involvement...

The aim of this paper is to offer a theoretical primer in order to analyse the demand of a central bank digital currency (CBDC). Using a financial portfolio approach and assuming that individual preferences and policy votes are consistent, we identify the drivers of the political consensus in...

The aim of the paper is to shed light on how two factors – central bank’s design and central bankers’ preferences – progressively assumed a crucial role in the evolution of monetary policy economics in the last four decades. The two factors jointly identify the importance of central bank...