Today policymakers in all the countries, shocked by the financial crisis of the 2007-2008, are reconsidering carefully the features of their supervisory regimes. This paper reviews the changing face of the financial supervisory regimes introducing new indicators to measure the level of...

In this paper we describe systemic financial risk as a pollution issue. Free riding leads to excess risk production. This problem may be solved, at least partially, either with financial regulation or taxation. From a normative viewpoint taxation is superior in many respects. However, reality...

Which are the new frontiers in central banking? Which things have changed in the aftermath of the financial, economic and sovereign debt crisis? These are questions raised frequently by central bankers, academics and interested observers alike. There are quite a few areas to cover in answering...

In June 2009 a new financial supervisory framework for the European Union (EU) was endorsed, consisting of a macro- and a micro-prudential pillar. The latter is composed of a Steering Committee, a supranational layer and a network of national supervisory authorities at the bottom, de facto...

We empirically investigate whether central bank independence (CBI) and the monetary policy setting can jointly influence the likelihood that policymakers assign banking supervision to central banks. We find that, conditional on the government being a benevolent one, higher central bank...

By the early ‘2000 an increasing numbers of countries had adopted a well defined central bank framework, which is characterized by two intertwined features: the authority becomes specialized in achieving the monetary policy goals, and consequently its traditional responsibilities in pursuing...

After the 2008 Financial Meltdown the need to reconsider the separation between commercial banking and other financial risky activities - ring fencing - in order to mitigate systemic risks and to address the too big to fail problems was publicly recognized both in the United States and in...

We investigate the reasons that induce policymakers to assign banking supervision to central banks rather than involving authorities outside the banking sector. On the one hand, empirical results provide evidence that policymakers prefer that, conditional on several known features affecting...

An increasing number of countries shows a trend towards a certain degree of consolidation of powers in financial supervision, which has resulted in the establishment of unified regulators, different from the national central banks. On the contrary a high involvement of the central bank in...