Showing 1 - 8 of 8
The paper characterises the choice rules that can be implemented when agents are unable to commit themselves not to renegotiate the mechanism.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745454
The paper characterises the choice rules that can be implemented when agents are unable to commit themselves not to renegotiate the mechanism.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005310297
This paper characterizes the choice rules that can be implemented when agents are unable to commit themselves not to renegotiate the mechanism. Copyright 1999 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005312783
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000167833
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001408774
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001366549
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10007687512
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012771115