We study reputation incentives in the director labor market and find that directors with multiple directorships distribute their effort unequally based on the directorship's relative prestige. When directors experience an exogenous increase in a directorship's relative ranking, their board...

This article surveys the recent literature on boards of directors and the interplay between director incentives and CEO incentives. The primary focus is on how the incentives and other characteristics of directors, boards and CEOs interact to affect firm performance. The article reviews the...

We use the 2003 NYSE and NASDAQ listing rules concerning board and committee independence as a quasi-natural experiment to examine the causal relations between board structure and CEO monitoring. Noncompliant firms forced to raise board independence or adopt a fully independent nominating...

We explore the determinants of compensation gaps between a firm's CEO and its other top executives, and compare the ability of two competing optimal contracting theories, namely tournament theory and productivity theory, to explain the cross sectional variability in these gaps across firms. We...