We consider implementation issues regarding two mechanisms that have been used to increase voter turnout in elections: fines and lotteries. We focus on the amount of the fine or lottery prize needed to achieve full participation. We then propose a combined, self-financing mechanism by which the...

We study a 2-player Blotto game where the n items have asymmetric values. The winner of each item is determined stochastically using a lottery mechanism. We analyze two payoff objectives: (i) players maximize their total expected payoffs and (ii) players maximize their probability of winning a...

We study two provisional fixed-prize mechanisms for funding public goods: an all-pay auction and a lottery. In our setting, the public good is provided only if the participants' contributions are greater than the fixed-prize value; otherwise contributions are refunded. We prove that in this...

We consider lotteries with reimbursements. It turns out that without loss of generality it is enough analyze lotteries where the winner gets her expenses reimbursed. We find that such a lottery (Sad-Loser) has multiple pure-strategy equilibria. We describe all equilibria and discuss their...

This paper analyses an evolutionary version of the Public Good game of Eshel, Samuelson, and Shaked (1998) in which agents can choose between imitation and best-reply decision rules. We describe conditions under which altruistic and spiteful (maximizing) behavior arise: these conditions are...

We study Tullock's (1980) n-player contest when each player has an independent probability 0 p 2 individual equilibrium spending as a function of p is single-peaked and satisfies a single-crossing property for any two different numbers of potential players. However, total equilibrium spending...

We consider a Blotto Game with Incomplete Information. A pure-strategy symmetric monotonic Bayesian equilibrium is found and its properties are discussed. Key words: Blotto Game, Imperfect Information. Journal of Economic Literature Classification: C72, D72.

We consider Tullock’s contests with reimbursements. It turns out that the winner-reimbursed contest maximizes the net total spending while the loser-reimbursed contest minimizes the net total spending. We investigate properties of contests with reimbursements and compare them with the classic...