We investigate a Stackelberg oligopoly model in which m leaders and N-m followers compete. We find an asymmetric welfare implication of the Stackelberg model. Introducing a small number of leaders into the Cournot model can reduce welfare. However, introducing a small number of followers into...

We investigate a Stackelberg oligopoly model in which m leaders and N-m followers compete. We find an asymmetric welfare implication of the Stackelberg model. Introducing a small number of leaders into the Cournot model can reduce welfare. However, introducing a small number of followers into...

We investigate the relationship between the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and welfare. First, we discuss the model wherein m leaders and N - m followers compete. Daughety (1990) finds that under linear demand and constant marginal cost, the Stackelberg model yields larger welfare and HHI than...

The purpose of this paper is to provide a systematic treatment of tax policies in mixed markets with endogenous entry. We consider three types of tax-subsidy policies: a simple unit subsidy, an entry-license tax, and a policy mixture of the two instruments. Under the unit-subsidy policy, in...

We investigate optimal taxsubsidy policies in mixed and private oligopolies with excess burden of taxation. We compare the optimal subsidies and the resulting welfare levels among four regimes: mixed and private Cournot duopolies and Stackelberg competition with public and private leaderships....

This paper investigates how horizontal mergers affect the optimal entry barrier (tax) in the presence of free entry and exit. We show that the government should raise the entry tax when a merger reduces the total number of firms entering.

We investigate a mixed oligopoly with misleading advertising competition. We find that, a welfare-maximizing public enterprise always engages in misleading advertising and that, an increase in the number of firms increases the profit and advertising level of each private firm.

We investigate a mixed market in which a state-owned, welfare-maximizing public firm competes against profit-maximizing n domestic private firms and m foreign private firms. A circular city model with quantity-setting competition is employed. We find that the equilibrium location pattern depends...

We investigate the manner in which vertical separation affects lobbying activities as well as the access charges for essential facilities. We find that vertical separation either increases or decreases the access charge, and this depends on the relative efficiency between the incumbent and new...

We investigate endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly in a differentiated product market. We find that private leadership is better than public leadership from a social welfare perspective if the private firm is domestic, regardless of the degree of product differentiation. Nevertheless, the...