We investigate revenue maximization in general allocation problems with incomplete information, where we assume quasi-linearity, private values, independent type distributions, and single-dimensionality of type spaces. We require a mechanism to satisfy strategy-proofness and ex-post individual...

We investigate a general class of dynamical open-bid combinatorial auction protocols termed price-demand procedures, where the auctioneer asks buyer-dependent price vectors and buyers reveal demand sets. Such revelations are easier to practice than the revelations of entire valuations at once....

This paper examines the ultimatum game preceded by a single player's investment decision that is risky in that the business opportunity could fail to be discovered. The experiment's results show that the functioning of social preference connecting the baseline ultimatum game with the investment...

We investigate combinatorial exchanges as a generalization of combinatorial auctions and bilateral trades, where the multiple commodities to be traded are possessed by participants and a central planner as endowments. Private values, risk neutrality, and independent types are assumed....

We investigate combinatorial auctions from a practical perspective. The auctioneer gathers information according to a dynamical protocol termed ask price procedure. We demonstrate a method for elucidating whether a procedure gathers sufficient information for deriving a VCG mechanism. We...

We investigate combinatorial exchanges as a generalization of auctions and bilateral trades, where multiple heterogeneous commodities are initially possessed not only by a central planner but also by participants. We assume private values, quasi-linearity, risk neutrality, and independent type...

We incorporate social influence into implementation theory, and highlight the manner in which an informed agent feels guilty with regard to disobeying an uninformed principal’s wishes. The degree of this feeling depends on the agent’s expectation of others’ behavioral modes....

We examine the impact of financial regulation and innovation on bubbles and crashes due to limited arbitrage by modeling timing games among strategic arbitrageurs whose rationality is not commonly known. An unproductive company raises funds by issuing shares, and for purchasing shares,...

We formulate strategic aspects of speculative arbitrageurs in a stock market as a generalization of timing game with behavioral types explored by Matsushima (2013b). A company raises huge funds during the bubble driven by positive feedback traders’ euphoria by issuing shares in a socially...

We examine repeated prisoners’ dilemma with imperfect private monitoring and random termination where the termination probability is low. We run laboratory experiments and show subjects retaliate more severely when monitoring is more accurate. This experimental result contradicts the...