We incorporate social influence into implementation theory, and highlight the manner in which an informed agent feels guilty with regard to disobeying an uninformed principal’s wishes. The degree of this feeling depends on the agent’s expectation of others’ behavioral modes....

We examine the impact of financial regulation and innovation on bubbles and crashes due to limited arbitrage by modeling timing games among strategic arbitrageurs whose rationality is not commonly known. An unproductive company raises funds by issuing shares, and for purchasing shares,...

We formulate strategic aspects of speculative arbitrageurs in a stock market as a generalization of timing game with behavioral types explored by Matsushima (2013b). A company raises huge funds during the bubble driven by positive feedback traders’ euphoria by issuing shares in a socially...

We examine repeated prisoners’ dilemma with imperfect private monitoring and random termination where the termination probability is low. We run laboratory experiments and show subjects retaliate more severely when monitoring is more accurate. This experimental result contradicts the...

We investigate revenue maximization in general allocation problems with incomplete information, where we assume quasi-linearity, private values, independent type distributions, and single-dimensionality of type spaces. We require a mechanism to satisfy strategy-proofness and ex-post individual...

We investigate a general class of dynamical open-bid combinatorial auction protocols termed price-demand procedures, where the auctioneer asks buyer-dependent price vectors and buyers reveal demand sets. Such revelations are easier to practice than the revelations of entire valuations at once....

We investigate combinatorial exchanges as a generalization of auctions and bilateral trades, where multiple heterogeneous commodities are initially possessed not only by a central planner but also by participants. We assume private values, quasi-linearity, risk neutrality, and independent type...

We argue that in order to achieve the VCG outcomes in combinatorial auctions, the auctioneer does not need to make a full contractual agreement on the protocol with participants. We can leave the detail of its design to the auctioneer's discretion. The auctioneer can even make it contingent on...

We investigate allocation problems that generalize auction and bargaining, namely multiunit exchanges, where both a central planner and participants bring homogeneous commodities to sell altogether, and there exist restrictions on feasible allocations. We characterize the optimal mechanism in...

We model the stock market as a timing game, in which arbitrageurs who are not expected to be certainly rational compete over profit by bursting the bubble caused by investors? euphoria. The manager raises money by issuing shares and the arbitrageurs use leverage. If leverage is weakly regulated,...