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von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching

Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent J.; Vergote, Wouter - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 6 (2011) 3, pp. 499-521

sets: a set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton subset of the core. Thus … cannot include matchings that are not in the core. Moreover, we show that our main result is robust to many-to-one matching … set and its element is in the strong core. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011691082

Von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching

Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent J.; Vergote, Wouter - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003704486

Von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching

Mauleon, Ana (contributor); … - 2008

We adopt the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets to predict which matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets: a set of matchings is a von...