Similar Search Results

Coalitional negotiation

Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent J. - 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001379031

Allocation rules for coalitional network games

Caulier, Jean-François; Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, … - In: Mathematical social sciences 78 (2015), pp. 80-88

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011439059

Constitutions and groups

Mauleon, Ana; Roehl, Nils; Vannetelbosch, Vincent J. - In: Games and economic behavior 107 (2018), pp. 135-152

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011976524

Common ranking and stability of overlapping coalitions

Mauleon, Ana; Roehl, Nils; Vannetelbosch, Vincent J. - 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011993318

Farsightedness and cautiousness in coalition formation

Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent J. - 2003

We adopt the largest consistent set defined by Chwe [J. of Econ. Theory 63 (1994), 299-235] to predict which coalition …, based on the assumption that players are cautious. For games with positive spillovers, many coalition structures may belong … to the largest consistent set. The grand coalition, which is the efficient coalition structure, always belongs to the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011591399

Whom are you talking with? : an experiment on credibility and communication structure

Grandjean, Gilles; Mantovani, Marco; Mauleon, Ana; … - 2014

The paper analyzes the role of the structure of communication - i.e. who is talking with whom - on the choice of messages, on their credibility and on actual play. We run an experiment in a three-player coordination game with Pareto ranked equilibria, where a pair of agents has a profitable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010418867