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We study the stability of social and economic networks when players are farsighted. In particular, we examine whether the networks formed by farsighted players are different from those formed by myopic players. We adopt Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch's (Games and Economic Behavior,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008811032
We study the stability of social and economic networks when players are farsighted. In particular, we examine whether the networks formed by farsighted players are different from those formed by myopic players. We adopt Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch’s (Games and Economic Behavior,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014205799
network is always pairwise stable and the partially connected network is stable if and only if spillovers are large enough. If … spillovers are small, the complete network is the efficient network; otherwise, the efficient network is the partially connected … network. Thus, a conflict between stability and efficiency may occur: efficient networks are pairwise stable, but the reverse …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014068404
Individuals are embedded in a network of relationships and they can be victims, bystanders, or perpetrators of bullying …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014082902
network is a horizon-K farsighted set whenever the degree of farsightedness of the criminals is larger than or equal to (n 1 …). Moreover, the complete network is the unique horizon-(n 1) farsighted set. Hence, the predictions obtained in case of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013228466
Pairwise stability (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) is the standard stability concept in network formation. It assumes … agents are farsighted, related stability concepts have been proposed. We design a simple network formation experiment to test …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010279552