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Von Neumann-Morgenstern Farsightedly Stable Sets in Two-Sided Matching
Vannetelbosch, Vincent J.; Mauleon, Ana; Vergote, Wouter - 2008
We adopt the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets to predict which matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets: a set of matchings is a von...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014219020
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Von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching
Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent; Vergote, Wouter - 2008
We adopt the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets to predict which matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets: a set of matchings is a von...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270949
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Von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching
Mauleon, Ana (contributor);  … - 2008
We adopt the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets to predict which matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets: a set of matchings is a von...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003715117
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Von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching
Mauleon, Ana (contributor);  … - 2008
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003727003
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Von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching
Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent J.; Vergote, Wouter - 2008
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003704486
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von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching
Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent J.; Vergote, Wouter - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 6 (2011) 3, pp. 499-521
sets: a set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton subset of the core. Thus … cannot include matchings that are not in the core. Moreover, we show that our main result is robust to many-to-one matching … set and its element is in the strong core. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011691082
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Farsightedness and cautiousness in coalition formation
Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent J. - 2003
We adopt the largest consistent set defined by Chwe [J. of Econ. Theory 63 (1994), 299-235] to predict which coalition structures are possibly stable when players are farsighted. We also introduce a refinement, the largest cautious consistent set, based on the assumption that players are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011591399
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Farsightedness and Cautiousness in Coalition Formation
Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent J. - 2003
We adopt the largest consistent set defined by Chwe [J. of Econ. Theory 63 (1994), 299-235] to predict which coalition structures are possibly stable when players are farsighted. We also introduce a refinement, the largest cautious consistent set, based on the assumption that players are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014076140
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Allocation rules for coalitional network games
Caulier, Jean-François; Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, … - 2013
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010204238
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Allocation rules for coalitional network games
Caulier, Jean-François; Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, … - In: Mathematical social sciences 78 (2015), pp. 80-88
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011439059