Chapter 1. Introduction -- Part I. Social Choice -- Chapter 2. Building Bridges over the Great Divide -- Chapter 3. Social Unacceptability for Simple Voting Procedures -- Chapter 4. Probability of Majority Inversion with Three States and Interval Preferences -- Chapter 5. Strategic Voting and...

Weighted committees allow shareholders, party leaders, etc. to wield different numbers of votes or voting weights as they decide between multiple candidates by a given social choice method. We consider committees that apply scoring methods such as plurality, Borda, or antiplurality rule. Many...

This thesis deals with the measurement of voting power in different decision environments. After a short introduction in Chapter 1, several established concepts for power analysis are reviewed and applied in Chapters 2 and 3. Chapters 4 and 5 step on new ground by introducing a power index for a...

Players in a committee, council, or electoral college often wield asymmetric numbers of votes. Binary decision environments are then conventionally modeled as weighted voting games. We introduce weighted committee games in order to describe decisions on three or more alternatives in similarly...

Weighted committees allow shareholders, party leaders, etc. to wield different numbers of votes or voting weights as they decide between multiple candidates by a given social choice method. We consider committees that apply scoring methods such as plurality, Borda, or antiplurality rule. Many...

Executive Directors of the International Monetary Fund elect the Fund’s Managing Director from a shortlist of three candidates; financial quotas of IMF members define the respective numbers of votes. The implied a priori distribution of success (preference satisfaction) is compared across...