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The problem of maintaining compliance within stable coalitions : experimental evidence
McEvoy, David M.; Murphy, James J.; Spraggon, John; … - In: Oxford economic papers 63 (2011) 3, pp. 475-498
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009241474
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Endogenous minimum participation in international environmental agreements : an experimental analysis
McEvoy, David M.; Cherry, Todd L.; Stranlund, John Kevin - In: Environmental & resource economics : the official … 62 (2015) 4, pp. 729-744
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011486925
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Inequality aversion and coalition formation
McEvoy, David M.; Stranlund, John Kevin - 2016
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011527437
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Self-enforcing international environmental agreements with costly monitoring for compliance
McEvoy, David M.; Stranlund, John Kevin - In: Environmental & resource economics : the official … 42 (2009) 4, pp. 491-508
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003830548
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Costly enforcement of voluntary environmental agreements
McEvoy, David M.; Stranlund, John Kevin - In: Environmental & resource economics : the official … 47 (2010) 1, pp. 45-63
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008697875
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The problem of maintaining compliance within stable coalitions: experimental evidence
McEvoy, David M.; Murphy, James J.; Spraggon, John M.; … - In: Oxford Economic Papers 63 (2011) 3, pp. 475-498
This study examines the performance of stable cooperative coalitions that form to provide a public good when coalition members have the opportunity to violate their commitments. A stable coalition is one in which no member wishes to leave and no non-member wishes to join. To counteract the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009148558
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The problem of maintaining compliance within stable coalitions: experimental evidence
McEvoy, David M.; Murphy, James J.; Spraggon, John M.; … - Department of Economics, College of Business and Public … - 2010
This study examines the performance of stable cooperative coalitions that form to provide a public good when coalition members have the opportunity to violate their commitments. A stable coalition is one in which no member wishes to leave and no non-member wishes to join. To counteract the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008852048
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The Problem of Maintaining Compliance within Stable Coalitions: Experimental Evidence
McEvoy, David M.; Murphy, James J.; Spraggon, John M.; … - Department of Economics, Appalachian State University - 2008
This study examines the performance of stable cooperative coalitions that form to provide a public good when coalition members have the opportunity to not comply with their commitments. A stable coalition is one in which no member wishes to leave and no non-member wishes to join. To counteract...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593698
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The Problem of Maintaining Compliance within Stable Coalitions: Experimental Evidence
McEvoy, David M.; Murphy, James J.; Spraggon, John M.; … - 2008
This study examines the performance of stable cooperative coalitions that form to provide a public good when coalition members have the opportunity to not comply with their commitments. A stable coalition is one in which no member wishes to leave and no non-member wishes to join. To counteract...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005162701
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The problem of maintaining compliance within stable coalitions: experimental evidence
McEvoy, David M.; Murphy, James J.; Spraggon, John M.; … - In: Oxford economic papers 63 (2011) 3, pp. 475-475
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009164342