Section 1 presents tests for the hypothesis that shifts in technology and industry composition might have played a key role in causing the U.S. listing gap. We replicate our core analysis at the industry level and find no evidence that the dynamics of the number of listing is driven by industry...

The abnormal decline in the number of US public firms is often blamed on merger activity, private equity investments, and stock market regulations. We compare and quantify the effects of these channels on the evolution of the US listing gap in a unified framework. In the US, an extra 100 mergers...

Using a sample of 1,593 US firms that go public between 1990 and 2007, we find that VC-backed IPOs experience less financial distress risk post-offering than do comparable non-VC-backed IPOs. After controlling for endogeneity, we find this is related to the screening done by VC-investors, who...

This study compares the SEO activity of young dual- and single-class firms. Because they hold stock with superior voting rights, dual-class insiders weigh different costs and benefits when issuing equity. Most importantly, the marginal dilution of voting power resulting from an SEO is lower in...

The abnormal decline in the number of US public firms is often blamed on merger activity, private equity investments, and stock market regulations. We compare the effects of these channels in a unified framework. In the US, an extra 100 mergers is associated with 41.56 additional missing public...

The abnormal decline in the number of US public firms is often blamed on mergers, private equity, and stock market regulations. We compare and quantify the effects of these channels in a unified framework. In the US, an extra 100 mergers is associated with 22.01 additional missing public firms,...

We examine the effect of board members with venture capital experience (i.e., VC directors) on executive incentives at publicly listed firms. VC directors serving on the compensation committee are associated with greater CEO risk-taking incentives (i.e., vega) and greater pay-for-performance...

We examine the effect of board members with venture capital experience (i.e., VC directors) on executive incentives at non-VC-backed public firms. VC directors serving on the compensation committee are associated with greater CEO risk-taking incentives (i.e., vega) and pay-for-performance...