This paper argues that dollarization can be beneficial for countries where credit-market frictions and non-credible stabilization policies are large distortions on economic activity and welfare. A dynamic general-equilibrium model with these features is proposed for the case of a small open...

This paper examines two potential benefits that emerging economies may derive from dollarization. First, dollarization may eliminate distortions induced by the lack of credibility of monetary policy. Second, dollarization may weaken financial frictions that result in endogenous credit...

We propose a model that solves the crucial disconnect between business cycle models that treat default risk as an exogenous interest rate on working capital, and sovereign default models that treat output fluctuations as an exogenous process with ad-hoc default costs. The model explains observed...

Emerging markets business cycle models treat default risk as part of an exogenous interest rate on working capital, while sovereign default models treat income fluctuations as an exogenous endowment process with ad-hoc default costs. We propose instead a general equilibrium model of both...

Models of business cycles in emerging economies explain the negative correlation between country spreads and output by modeling default risk as an exogenous interest rate on working capital. Models of strategic default explain the cyclical properties of sovereign spreads by assuming an exogenous...

The ratios of public debt as a share of gdp of Brazil, Colombia and Mexico were 12 percentage points higher on average during the period 1996-2005 than in the period 1990-1995. Costa Rica’s debt ratio remained stable but at a high level; near 50 per cent. Is there reason to be concerned about...

Europe's debt crisis resembles historical episodes of outright default on domestic public debt about which little research exists. This paper proposes a theory of domestic sovereign default based on distributional incentives affecting the welfare of risk-averse debt and non debtholders. A...

Infrequent but turbulent overt sovereign defaults on domestic creditors are a "forgotten history" in Macroeconomics. We propose a heterogeneous-agents model in which the government chooses optimal debt and default on domestic and foreign creditors by balancing distributional incentives v. the...

Europe's debt crisis resembles historical episodes of outright default on domestic public debt about which little research exists. This paper proposes a theory of domestic sovereign default based on distributional incentives affecting the welfare of risk-averse debt and non-debtholders. A...

Emerging economies that are large oil producers have sizable external debt, their country risk rises when oil prices fall, and several of them have defaulted at least once since 1979. Moreover, while oil and non-oil output reduce country risk on impact and in the long-run, oil reserves reduce it...