In this paper we consider sequential auctions where an individual's value for a bundle of objects is either greater than the sum of the values for the objects separately (positive synergy)or less than the sum (negative synergy). We show that the existence of positive synergies implies declining...

Suppose a seller wants to sell $k$ similar or identical objects and there are $nk$ potential buyers. Suppose that buyers want only one object. (This is a reasonable assumption in the sale of condominiums or in the sale of government-owned residential units to low-income families). In this case,...

We analyze simultaneous discrete public good games with incomplete information and continuous contributions. We consider contribution and subscription games. We show that every equilibrium is inefficient. We also provide a sufficient condition for 'contributing zero' to be the unique equilibrium...

We investigate the outcome of an auction where the auctioneer approaches one of the two existing bidders and offers an opportunity for him to match his opponent's bid in exchange for a bribe. In particular, we examine two types of corruption arrangements. In the first case, the auctioneer...

Suppose a seller wants to sell k similar or identical objects and there are nk potential buyers. Suppose that each buyer wants only one object. In this case, we suggest the use of a simultaneous auction that would work as follows. Players are asked to submit sealed bids for one object. The...