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This paper studies the nonparametric identification and estimation of voters' preferences when voters are ideological. We establish that voter preference distributions and other parameters of interest can be identified from aggregate electoral data. We also show that these objects can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011317976
This paper studies the nonparametric identification and estimation of voters' preferences when voters are ideological. We build on the methods introduced by Degan and Merlo (2009) representing elections as Voronoi tessellations of the ideological space. We exploit the properties of this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014187524
This paper studies the nonparametric identification and estimation of voters' preferences when voters are ideological. We establish that voter preference distributions and other parameters of interest can be identified from aggregate electoral data. We also show that these objects can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013074791
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011391955
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011920048
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008856197
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010387462
In this paper we consider a dynamic model of government formation and termination in parliamentary democracies. Our analysis accounts for the following observed phenomena: (1) Cabinet reshuffles; (2) Cabinet replacements; (3) Early elections; (4) Surplus governments; (5) Minority governments;...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005824644
In this paper we address the following question: To what extent is the hypothesis that voters vote sincerely testable or falsifiable? We show that using data only on how individuals vote in a single election, the hypothesis that voters vote sincerely is irrefutable, regardless of the number of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005828909
In this paper we present a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying. We find that lobbying induces policy compromise and always affects equilibrium policy outcomes. In particular, even though the policy preferences of lobbies are relatively extreme, lobbying...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746186