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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011611100
This paper studies competitive equilibria of a production economy with aggregate productivity shocks. There is a continuum of consumers who face borrowing constraints and individual labor endowment shocks. The dynamic economy is described in terms of sequences of aggregate distributions. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009220138
This paper studies competitive equilibria of a production economy with aggregate productivity shocks and with a continuum of consumers subject to borrowing constraints and individual labor endowment shocks. The dynamic economy is described in terms of sequences of aggregate distributions. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005561113
This paper studies competitive equilibria of a production economy with aggregate productivity shocks. There is a continuum of consumers who face borrowing constraints and individual labor endowment shocks. The dynamic economy is described in terms of sequences of aggregate distributions. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014028443
This paper studies competitive equilibria of a production economy with aggregate productivity shocks and with a continuum of consumers subject to borrowing constraints and individual labor endowment shocks. The dynamic economy is described in terms of sequences of aggregate distributions. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014029766
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010480660
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003381767
This paper presents a contracting model of governance based on the premise that CEOs are the main promoters of governance change. CEOs use their power to extract higher pay or private benefits, and different governance structures are preferred by different CEOs as they favor one or the other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010658717
This paper presents a contracting model of governance based on the premise that CEOs are the main promoters of governance change. CEOs use their power to extract higher pay or private benefits, and different governance structures are preferred by different CEOs as they favor one or the other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010592923
This paper presents a contracting model of governance based on the premise that CEOs are the main promoters of governance change. CEOs use their power to extract higher pay or private benefits, and different governance structures are preferred by different CEOs as they favour one or the other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656247