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In a world of imperfect information, reputations often guide the sequential decisions to trust and to reward trust. We consider two-player situations, where one player--the truster--decides whether to trust, and the other player--the temptee--has a temptation to betray when trusted. The strength...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009003913
In a world of imperfect information, reputations often guide the sequential decisions to trust and to reward trust. We consider two-player situations, where the players meet but once. One player--the truster--decides whether to trust, and the other player--the temptee--has a temptation to betray...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010602071
Reputations often guide sequential decisions to trust and to reward trust. We consider situations where each player is randomly matched with a partner in every period. One player – the truster – decides whether to trust. If trusted, the other player – the temptee – has a temptation to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931192
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011304961
"In a world of imperfect information, reputations often guide the sequential decisions to trust and to reward trust. We consider two-player situations, where the trusted player, called the temptee, has a temptation to betray. The strength of the temptation to betray varies from encounter to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008688852
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009667493
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009011097
In a world of imperfect information, reputations often guide the sequential decisions to trust and to reward trust. We consider two-player situations where the players meet but once. One player - the truster - decides whether to trust, and the other player - the temptee - has a temptation to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462233
In a world of imperfect information, reputations often guide the sequential decisions to trust and to reward trust. We consider two-player situations, where one player - the truster - decides whether to trust, and the other player - the temptee - has a temptation to betray when trusted. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014181330
In a world of imperfect information, reputations often guide the sequential decisions to trust and to reward trust. We consider two-player situations where the players meet but once. One player - the truster - decides whether to trust, and the other player - the temptee - has a temptation to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013137612