Existing literature usually considers earnings manipulation to be a negative social phenomenon. We argue that earnings manipulation can be a part of the equilibrium relationships between firm's…insiders and outsiders. We consider an optimal contract between an entrepreneur and an investor where...

This paper shows that asymmetric information about the timing of earnings can affect corporate capital structure. It sheds new light on the following issues: why profitable firms may be interested in issuing equity and why debt does not necessarily signal a firm's quality. These issues seem to...

A recent wave of scandals in the corporate world has raised heated debates regarding the manipulation of earnings by firms' insiders. Existing literature usually considers earnings manipulation to be a negative social phenomenon and suggests measures for its elimination. In the present paper, we...

The literature analyzing games where some players have private information about their types is usually based on the duality of good and bad types (GB approach), where good type denotes the type with better quality. In contrast, this paper analyzes a signalling game without types hierarchy....

Traditional pecking-order theory (POT) cannot explain why good-quality firms issue equity: this is often considered to be an empirical puzzle. We build a model of capital structure that has elements of both asymmetric information and behavioral finance. Firms have private information about their...

We consider an optimal contract between an entrepreneur and an investor, where the entrepreneur is subject to a double moral hazard problem (one being the choice of production effort and the other being earnings manipulation). Since the entrepreneur cannot completely capture the results of his...

Following some recent empirical papers we focus on the key feature of quot;Pecking-order theoryquot; (POT) - the existence and the extent of asymmetric information between firms' insiders and outsiders. We analyze the debt-equity choice for financing a two-stage investment and consider different...

This paper analyzes the debt-equity choice for financing a two-stage investment when a firm's insiders have private information about the firm's expected earnings. When private information is one-dimensional (for example when short-term earnings are common knowledge while long-term earnings are...

Following some recent empirical papers we focus on the key feature of Pecking-order theory (POT) - the existence and the extent of asymmetric information between firms' insiders and outsiders. We analyze the debt-equity choice for financing a two-stage investment and consider different...

This paper shows that asymmetric information about the timing of earnings can affect corporate capital structure. It sheds new light on the following issues: why profitable firms may be interested in issuing equity and why debt does not necessarily signal a firm's quality. These issues seem to...