Existing literature usually considers earnings manipulation to be a negative social phenomenon. We argue that earnings manipulation can be a part of the equilibrium relationships between firm's…insiders and outsiders. We consider an optimal contract between an entrepreneur and an investor where...

The literature analyzing games where some players have private information about their "types" is usually based on the duality of "good" and "bad" types (GB approach), where "good" type denotes the type with better quality. In contrast, this paper analyzes a signalling game without types...

This paper analyzes debt-equity choice for financing a two-stage investment when a firm’s insiders have private information about the firm’s expected earnings. When private information is one-dimensional (for example when short-term earnings are common knowledge while long-term earnings are...

This paper shows that asymmetric information about the timing of earnings can affect corporate capital structure. It sheds some new light on two following questions: why may profitable firms be interested in issuing equity, and why does debt not necessarily signal a firm quality. These issues...

This paper shows that asymmetric information about the timing of earnings can affect corporate capital structure. It sheds some new light on two following questions: why may profitable firms be interested in issuing equity, and why does debt not necessarily signal a firm quality. These issues...

The literature analyzing games where some players have private information about their "types" is usually based on the duality of "good" and "bad" types (GB approach), where "good" type denotes the type with better quality. In contrast, this paper analyzes a signalling game without types...

This paper analyzes debt-equity choice for financing a two-stage investment when a firm’s insiders have private information about the firm’s expected earnings. When private information is one-dimensional (for example when short-term earnings are common knowledge while long-term earnings are...

Existing literature on property rights stresses the effect that distortions in future investment decisions have on establishing the optimal property rights. This paper demonstrates that property rights may also be affected by contracts, which exist prior to the establishment of property rights....

We consider an optimal contract between an entrepreneur and an investor, where the entrepreneur is subject to a double moral hazard problem (one being the choice of production effort and the other being earnings manipulation). Since the entrepreneur cannot entirely capture the results of his...

This paper shows that asymmetric information about the timing of earnings can affect corporate capital structure. It sheds new light on the following issues: why profitable firms may be interested in issuing equity and why debt does not necessarily signal a firm's quality. These issues seem to...