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Equilibrium flow in a physical network with a large number of users (e.g., transportation, communication, and computer networks) may not be unique if the costs of the network elements are not the same for all uses. Such differences among users may arise if they are not equally affected by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010861923
A group of people with identical preferences but different abilities in identifying the best alternative (e.g., a jury) takes a vote to decide between two alternatives. The first best voting rule is a weighted voting rule that takes into account the different individual competences, and is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010861930
In a number of large, important families of finite games, not only do pure-strategy Nash equilibria always exist but they are also reachable from any initial strategy profile by some sequence of myopic single-player moves to a better or best-response strategy. This weak acyclicity property is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010942384
No matter how many times a prisoner’s-dilemma-like game is repeated, the only equilibrium outcome is the one in which all players defect in all periods. However, if cooperation among the players changes their perception of the game by making defection increasingly less attractive, then it is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008553032
A formula is presented for computing the completely mixed equilibrium payoffs in finite two-person games.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008553038
Different kinds of networks, such as transportation, communication, computer, and supply networks, are susceptible to similar kinds of inefficiencies. These arise when congestion externalities make each user-s cost depend on the other users, choices of routes. If each user chooses the least...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008553040
When a group of people with identical preferences but different abilities in identifying the best alternative (e.g., a jury) takes a vote to decide between two alternatives, the question of strategic voting arises. That is, depending on the voting rule used to determine the collective decision,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008553043
In a correlated equilibrium, the players’ choice of actions is affected by random, correlated messages that they receive from an outside source, or mechanism. This allows for more equilibrium outcomes than without such messages (pure-strategy equilibrium) or with statistically independent ones...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008516091
Every finite noncooperative game can be presented as a weighted network congestion game, and also as a network congestion game with player-specific costs. In the first presentation, different players may contribute differently to congestion, and in the second, they are differently (negatively)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008526367
Static stability of equilibrium in strategic games differs from dynamic stability in not being linked to any particular dynamical system. In other words, it does not make any assumptions about off-equilibrium behavior. Examples of static notions of stability include evolutionarily stable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008626031