This paper explores how vertical relations influence the timing of new technology adoption. It shows that both the bargaining power distribution among the vertically related firms and the contract type through which vertical trading is conducted affect crucially the speed of adoption: the...

This paper explores how vertical relations influence the timing of new technology adoption. It shows that both the bargaining power distribution among the vertically related firms and the contract type through which vertical trading is conducted affect crucially the speed of adoption: the...

We study competing vertical chains where upstream and downstream firms bargain over their form and terms of trading. Both (conditionally) inefficient wholesale price contracts and efficient contracts that take the form of price-quantity bundles (and not of two-tariffs) arise in equilibrium under...

Contrary to the seminal paper of Horn and Wolinsky (1988), we demonstrate that upstream firms, which sell their products to competing downstream firms, do not always have incentives to merge horizontally. In particular, we show that when bargaining takes place over two-part tariffs, and not over...