Abstract We analyse the properties of optimal price adjustment to hospitals when no lump-sum transfers are allowed and when prices differ to reflect observable exogenous differences in costs. We find that: (a) when the marginal benefit from treatment is decreasing and the cost function is the...

Activity-based funding involves remunerating healthcare providers a fixed price per patient in each payment category. However, no categorisation system can account perfectly for differences in patient complexity. Differences may be systematic if providers routinely attract high-risk patients or...

Prospective payment systems are currently used in many OECD countries, where hospitals are paid a fixed price for each patient treated. We develop a theoretical model to analyse the properties of the optimal fixed prices to be paid to hospitals when no lump-sum transfers are allowed and when the...

The English government has encouraged private providers – known as Independent Sector Treatment Centres (ISTCs) – to treat publicly funded (NHS) patients. Providers are paid a fixed price per patient treated, adjusted to reflect geographical differences in input costs. But there may be other...