We document that the dispersion of failure risk across banks within a given region in the U.S. is greater in regions that have higher income inequality. We explain this pattern with a model based on risk shifting incentives where banks issue insured deposits and choose the riskiness of their...

We study bank default risk in a model with a competitive banking sector where banks lend to risky borrowers and adjust interest rates accordingly. Our main result is the following unconventional equilibrium relationship: a bank can be more likely to default with less risky borrowers than with...

We document that the dispersion of failure risk across banks within a given region in the U.S. is greater in regions that have higher income inequality. We explain this pattern with a model based on risk shifting incentives where banks issue insured deposits and choose the riskiness of their...

We document that the dispersion of failure risk across banks within a given region in the U.S. is greater in regions that have higher income inequality. We explain this pattern with a model based on risk shifting incentives where banks issue insured deposits and choose the riskiness of their...

We use tools from survival analysis to study the equilibrium probability of bank failure in a model with imperfect correlation in loan defaults where a systematic risk factor and idiosyncratic frailty factors govern borrower credit worth. We derive several surprising results: in equilibrium, a...

We use tools from survival analysis to study the equilibrium probability of bank failure in a model with imperfect correlation in loan defaults where a systematic risk factor and idiosyncratic frailty factors govern borrower credit worth. We derive several surprising results: in equilibrium, a...