This paper focuses on the mean vote procedure for choosing the quantity of a public good, a social choice rule that selects the mean of the quantities voted for. The available theoretical models of mean voting give rise to conflicting predictions about the extent of the strategic bias that might...

<em>Voting Rule and Collective Choice: An Experiment </em> (by Carla Marchese, Marcello Montefiori) - This paper concerns the problem of collective choices and misrepresentation of preferences. Even if many mechanism have been suggested in the literature, the problem of free riding and strategic...

This paper considers the problem of voting about the quantity of a public good. An experiment has been run in order to test the extent of the strategic bias that arises in the individual vote when the social choice rule is to select the mean of the quantities voted for; conflicting theoretical...

This paper considers the problem of voting about the quantity of a public good. An experiment has been run in order to test the extent of the strategic bias that arises in the individual vote when the social choice rule is to select the mean of the quantities voted for; conflicting theoretical...