There are two parts to this paper. Part One introduces the subject of implementation, and provides applications (in particular, to the theory of contracts). This part is written so as to be accessible to the general reader. Part Two surveys the literature, and is somewhat more formal.

In the last few years, a new area has emerged in economic theory, which goes under the heading of 'incomplete contracting'. However, almost since its inception, the theory has been under attack for its lack of rigorous foundations. In this paper we evaluate some of the criticisms that have been...

The paper characterises the choice rules that can be implemented when agents are unable to commit themselves not to renegotiate the mechanism.

We develop a model of hierarchies based on the allocation of authority. A firm's owners have ultimate authority over a firm's decisions, but they have limited time or capacity to exercise this authority. Hence owners must delegate authority to subordinates. However, these subordinates also have...

We propose a new bankruptcy procedure that makes use of multiple auctions. The procedure is designed to work even when capital markets do not function well (for example, in developing economies, or in economies in transition) - although it can be used in all economies.