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experimental results suggest: In a simple bargaining game with an exogenous mediation proposal, the likelihood of conflict is … independent of the balance of power. If bargaining involves endogenous demand choices, however, the likelihood of conflict is …We study the role of an imbalance in fighting strengths when players bargain in the shadow of conflict. Our …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011202941
experimental results suggest: In a simple bargaining game with an exogenous mediation proposal, the likelihood of conflict is … independent of the balance of power. If bargaining involves endogenous demand choices, however, the likelihood of conflict is …We study the role of an imbalance in fighting strengths when players bargain in the shadow of conflict. Our …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011637947
experimental results suggest: In a simple bargaining game with an exogenous mediation proposal, the likelihood of conflict is … independent of the balance of power. If bargaining involves endogenous demand choices, however, the likelihood of conflict is …We study the role of an imbalance in fighting strengths when players bargain in the shadow of conflict. Our …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011576771
This paper considers evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) in a take-it-or-leave-it offer bargaining game with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013048099
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012603927
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014514886
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012309777
outside enemy, brothers in arms may already anticipate future internal conflict about dividing the spoils of winning; however …, this subsequent internal conflict does not discourage alliance members from expending much effort in the contest against …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009397117
We study endogenous group formation in tournaments employing experimental three-player contests. We find that players in endogenously formed alliances cope better with the moral hazard problem in groups than players who are forced into an alliance. Also, players who are committed to expending...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010860231
We experimentally study endogenous alliance formation and contest effort choices in a generic three-player contest. Differences in intrinsic or extrinsic incentives to expend effort cause self-selection. Weakly motivated players have an incentive to enter into an alliance and to free-ride on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011190199