We study the role of an imbalance in fighting strengths when players bargain in the shadow of conflict. Our … experimental results suggest: In a simple bargaining game with an exogenous mediation proposal, the likelihood of conflict is … independent of the balance of power. If bargaining involves endogenous demand choices, however, the likelihood of conflict is …

outside enemy, brothers in arms may already anticipate future internal conflict about dividing the spoils of winning; however …, this subsequent internal conflict does not discourage alliance members from expending much effort in the contest against …

conflict and more intense fighting. …

This paper considers evolutionarily stable decisions about whether to initiate violent conflict rather than accepting a … of peaceful resource allocations that are rejected in favor of violent conflict, compared to the Nash equilibrium …

conflict and more intense fighting. …

outside enemy, ‘brothers in arms’ may already anticipate future internal conflict about dividing the spoils of winning …; however, this subsequent internal conflict does not discourage alliance members from expending much effort in the contest …

We study conflict between two groups of individuals. Using Schaffer`s (1988) concept of evolutionary stability we …