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Economic models routinely assume firms maximize shareholder wealth; however common law legal systems only require that officers and directors pursue the interests of the corporation, leaving this ill-defined. Economic arguments for shareholder wealth maximization derived from shareholders'...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012955820
Economic models routinely assume firms maximize shareholder wealth; however common law legal systems only require that officers and directors pursue the interests of the corporation, leaving this ill-defined. Economic arguments for shareholder wealth maximization derived from shareholders'...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012955910
Economic models routinely assume firms maximize shareholder wealth; however common law legal systems only require that officers and directors pursue the interests of the corporation, leaving this ill-defined. Economic arguments for shareholder wealth maximization derived from shareholders'...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014023372
Economics has firms maximizing value and people maximizing utility, but firms are run by people. Agency theory concerns the mitigation of this internal contradiction in capitalism. Firms need charters, regulations and laws to restrain those entrusted with their governance, just as economies need...
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of creditors when dealing with firms outside bank groups. Corporate control mechanisms other than bank oversight appear … necessary in these firms. When dealing with firms in bank groups, banks may act in the broader interests of a range of … stakeholders, including shareholders. However, our findings are also consistent with banks “propping up” troubled bank group firms …
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Shareholder valuations are economically and statistically positively correlated with independent directors' power, gauged by social network power centrality. Powerful independent directors' sudden deaths reduce shareholder value significantly; other independent directors' deaths do not. More...
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