Similar Search Results

Kimbrough, Erik O.; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Shields, Timothy - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2011

We examine conflict resolution via a random device. We model conflict as a two-agent rent-seeking contest for a fixed prize. Before conflict arises, both agents may agree to allocate the prize by coin flip to avoid the costs of conflict. In equilibrium, risk-neutral agents with relatively...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009323518

Side-Payments and the Costs of Conflict.

Kimbrough, Erik O.; Sheremeta, Roman M. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2012

Conflict and competition often impose costs on both winners and losers, and conflicting parties may prefer to resolve the dispute before it occurs. The equilibrium of a conflict game with side-payments predicts that with binding offers, proposers make and responders accept side-payments,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009647549

An experimental investigation of Colonel Blotto games

Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Kovenock, Dan; Sheremeta, Roman M. - Abteilung "Marktprozesse und Steuerung", … - 2009

This article examines behavior in the two-player, constant-sum Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric resources in which players maximize the expected number of battlefields won. The experimental results support all major theoretical predictions. In the auction treatment, where winning a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009367897

The Attack and Defense of Weakest-Link Networks

Kovenock, Dan; Roberson, Brian; Sheremeta, Roman M. - Krannert School of Management, Purdue University - 2010

This paper experimentally examines behavior in a two-player game of attack and defense of a weakest-link network of targets, in which the attacker’s objective is to successfully attack at least one target and the defender’s objective is diametrically opposed .We apply two benchmark contest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008728040

An Experimental Investigation of Colonel Blotto Games

Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Dan Kovenock J.; Sheremeta, … - CESifo - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005034634

Facing Your Opponents: Social identification and information feedback in contests.

Mago, Shakun D.; Savikhin, Anya C.; Sheremeta, Roman M. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2012

We experimentally investigate the effect of social identification and information feedback on individual behavior in contests. Identifying subjects through photo display decreases efforts. Providing information feedback about others’ effort does not affect the aggregate effort levels but it...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817374

Why Can’t We Be Friends? Entitlements, bargaining, and conflict.

Kimbrough, Erik O.; Sheremeta, Roman M. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2012

We design an experiment to explore the impact of earned entitlements on the frequency and intensity of conflicts in a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817376

Multi-Battle Contests: An Experimental Study

Mago, Shakun D.; Sheremeta, Roman M. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2012

This study examines behavior of subjects in simultaneous and sequential multi-battle contests. In simultaneous contests, subjects make positive bids in each battle 80% of the time and bids fall within the predicted boundaries. However, 35% of the time subjects make positive bids in only two,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817377

Limitations to Signaling Trust with All or Nothing Investments

Schniter, Eric; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Shields, Timothy W. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2013

Many economic interactions are characterized by “all or nothing” action spaces that may limit a demonstrable index of trust and, therefore, the propensity to reciprocate. In two experimental trust games, the action space governing investments was manipulated to examine the effects on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817379

You Can’t Put Old Wine in New Bottles: The Effect of Newcomers on Coordination in Groups

Sheremeta, Roman M.; McCarter, Matthew W. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2013

of member change on performance? To answer these questions we conduct an experiment in which we investigate the effect of … first part of the experiment, and then two members of the group are replaced with new participants, and the newly formed … group plays the game for the second part of the experiment. Our results show that the arrival of newcomers decreases trust …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817394