Similar Search Results

Facing Your Opponents: Social identification and information feedback in contests.

Mago, Shakun D.; Savikhin, Anya C.; Sheremeta, Roman M. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2012

We experimentally investigate the effect of social identification and information feedback on individual behavior in contests. Identifying subjects through photo display decreases efforts. Providing information feedback about others’ effort does not affect the aggregate effort levels but it...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817374

Why Can’t We Be Friends? Entitlements, bargaining, and conflict.

Kimbrough, Erik O.; Sheremeta, Roman M. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2012

We design an experiment to explore the impact of earned entitlements on the frequency and intensity of conflicts in a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817376

Multi-Battle Contests: An Experimental Study

Mago, Shakun D.; Sheremeta, Roman M. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2012

This study examines behavior of subjects in simultaneous and sequential multi-battle contests. In simultaneous contests, subjects make positive bids in each battle 80% of the time and bids fall within the predicted boundaries. However, 35% of the time subjects make positive bids in only two,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817377

Limitations to Signaling Trust with All or Nothing Investments

Schniter, Eric; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Shields, Timothy W. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2013

Many economic interactions are characterized by “all or nothing” action spaces that may limit a demonstrable index of trust and, therefore, the propensity to reciprocate. In two experimental trust games, the action space governing investments was manipulated to examine the effects on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817379

You Can’t Put Old Wine in New Bottles: The Effect of Newcomers on Coordination in Groups

Sheremeta, Roman M.; McCarter, Matthew W. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2013

of member change on performance? To answer these questions we conduct an experiment in which we investigate the effect of … first part of the experiment, and then two members of the group are replaced with new participants, and the newly formed … group plays the game for the second part of the experiment. Our results show that the arrival of newcomers decreases trust …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817394

Endowment Origin, Demographic Effects and Individual Preferences in Contests

Price, Curtis R.; Sheremeta, Roman M. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2012

efficiency in contests. To this end, we conduct a laboratory experiment in which subjects are asked to allot costly resources …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817406

Overbidding and overspreading in rent-seeking experiments: Cost structure and prize allocation rules

Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Turocy, … - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2014

We study experimentally the effects of cost structure and prize allocation rules on the performance of rent-seeking contests. Most previous studies use a lottery prize rule and linear cost, and ?nd both overbidding relative to the Nash equilibrium prediction and signi?cant variation of efforts,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817408

Recognizing Contributors: An Experiment on Public Goods

Savikhin Samek, Anya; Sheremeta, Roman M. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2013

We experimentally investigate the impact of recognizing contributors on public good contributions. We vary recognizing all, highest or lowest contributors. Consistent with previous studies, recognizing all contributors significantly increases contributions relative to the baseline. Recognizing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817411

Best-of-Three Contest Experiments: Strategic versus Psychological Momentum

Mago, Shakun D.; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Yates, Andrew - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2012

We conduct an experimental analysis of a best-of-three contest. Intermediate prizes lead to higher efforts, while increasing the role of luck (as opposed to effort) leads to lower efforts. Both intermediate prizes and luck reduce the probability of contest ending in two rounds. The patterns of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817420

Overdissipation and Convergence in Rent-seeking Experiments: Cost structure and prize allocation rules.

Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Turocy, … - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2012

We study experimentally the effects of cost structure and prize allocation rules on the performance of rent-seeking contests. Most previous studies use a lottery prize rule and linear cost, and find both overdissipation relative to Nash equilibrium prediction and significant variation in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817421