Showing 1 - 10 of 100
We study price discrimination in a market in which two firms engage in Bertrand competition. Some consumers are contested by both firms, and other consumers are “captive” to one of the firms. The market can be divided into segments, which have different relative shares of captive and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012834256
We study a linear interaction model with asymmetric information. We first characterize the linear Bayes Nash … information structure.We use our results in a variety of applications: (i) we study the connections between incomplete information … and strategic interaction, (ii) we explain to what extent payoff environment and information structure of a economy are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012955894
We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013004045
We explore the impact of private information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders uncertain whether they …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013011350
In an economy of interacting agents with both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks, we examine how the information … structure determines aggregate volatility. We show that the maximal aggregate volatility is attained in a noise free information … joint distributions over actions and states that can arise in equilibrium under any information structure. This tractable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013052631
This paper explores the consequences of information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and … Bayesian equilibrium for some information structure. In particular, we characterize maximum and minimum revenue across all … information structures when bidders may not know their own values, and maximum revenue when they do know their values. Revenue is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013017815
We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012992717
private information influences aggregate volatility. The maximal aggregate volatility is attained in a noise free information … over actions and states that can arise in equilibrium under any information structure. This tractable characterization …, extending results in Bergemann and Morris, can be used to address a wide variety of questions linking information with the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013045592
private information in fluences aggregate volatility. The maximal aggregate volatility is attained in a noise free information … over actions and states that can arise in equilibrium under any information structure. This tractable characterization …, extending results in Bergemann and Morris, can be used to address a wide variety of questions linking information with the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013061893
We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012982245