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First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Bergemann, Dirk - 2016

We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013004045

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Bergemann, Dirk - 2015

We explore the impact of private information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders uncertain whether they …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013011350

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Bergemann, Dirk - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012992717

The Role of the Common Prior in Robust Implementation

Bergemann, Dirk - 2007

We consider the role of the common prior for robust implementation in an environment with interdependent values. Specifically, we investigate a model of public good provision which allows for negative and positive informational externalities. In the corresponding direct mechanism, the agents'...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012775991

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Bergemann, Dirk - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012982245

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Bergemann, Dirk - 2015

This paper explores the consequences of information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and … Bayesian equilibrium for some information structure. In particular, we characterize maximum and minimum revenue across all … information structures when bidders may not know their own values, and maximum revenue when they do know their values. Revenue is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013017815