Showing 1 - 10 of 141
We consider the problem of a leader who can assign rewards for citizens for different anti-regime actions. Citizens face a coordination problem in which each citizen has a private, endogenous degree of optimism about the likelihood of regime change. Because more optimistic citizens are easier to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014111442
We formalize Tilly's (1978, 2006, 2008) concept of repertoires of contentious actions, and analyze how the structure of state repression affects the variety of observed contentious actions. Introducing the notion of repertoire width, we show that when state repression accelerates with higher...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013236259
We characterize revenue maximizing mechanisms in a common value environment where the value of the object is equal to the highest of bidders’ independent signals. If the object is optimally sold with probability one, then the optimal mechanism is simply a posted price, with the highest...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189042
Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599373
In a general interdependent preference environment, we characterize when two payoff types can be distinguished by their rationalizable strategic choices without any prior knowledge of their beliefs and higher order beliefs. We show that two payoff types are strategically distinguishable if and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599415
A game of incomplete information can be decomposed into a basic game and an information structure. The basic game defines the set of actions, the set of payoff states the payoff functions and the common prior over the payoff states. The information structure refers to the signals that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599575
In a general interdependent preference environment, we characterize when two payoff types can be distinguished by their rationalizable strategic choices without any prior knowledge of their beliefs and higher order beliefs. We show that two payoff types are strategically distinguishable if and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005515737
We consider an single object auction environment with interdependent valuations and a generalized Vickrey-Clark-Groves allocation mechanism that allocates the object almost efficiently in a strict ex post equilibrium. If there is a significant amount of interdependence, there are multiple...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463846
We consider parametric examples of two-bidder private value auctions in which each bidder observes her own private valuation as well as noisy signals about her opponentÌs private valuation. In such multidimensional private value auction environments, we show that the revenue equivalence between...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463947
We analyze the problem of fully implementing a social choice set in ex post equilibrium. Weidentify an ex post monotonicity condition that is necessary and -- in economic environments -- sufficient for full implementation in ex post equilibrium. We also identify an ex post monotonicityno veto...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463973