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First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue
Bergemann, Dirk - 2016
We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013004045
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First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue
Bergemann, Dirk - 2015
We explore the impact of private information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders uncertain whether they …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013011350
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First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue
Bergemann, Dirk - 2016
We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012992717
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The Role of the Common Prior in Robust Implementation
Bergemann, Dirk - 2007
We consider the role of the common prior for robust implementation in an environment with interdependent values. Specifically, we investigate a model of public good provision which allows for negative and positive informational externalities. In the corresponding direct mechanism, the agents'...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012775991
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First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue
Bergemann, Dirk - 2016
We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012982245
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First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue
Bergemann, Dirk - 2015
This paper explores the consequences of information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and … Bayesian equilibrium for some information structure. In particular, we characterize maximum and minimum revenue across all … information structures when bidders may not know their own values, and maximum revenue when they do know their values. Revenue is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013017815
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Contagious Adverse Selection
Morris, Stephen; Shin, Hyun Song - In: American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 4 (2012) 1, pp. 1-21
We illustrate the corrosive effect of even small amounts of adverse selection in an asset market and show how it can lead to the total breakdown of trade. The problem is the failure of "market confidence," defined as approximate common knowledge of an upper bound on expected losses. Small...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009399096
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Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games
Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2013
A game of incomplete information can be decomposed into a basic game and an information structure. The basic game … information structure refers to the signals that the players receive in the game. We characterize the set of outcomes that can … arise in Bayes Nash equilibrium if players observe the given information structure but may also observe additional signals …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255267
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Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information
Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2011
We define a notion of correlated equilibrium for games with incomplete information in a general setting with finite … of a fixed incomplete information game equals the set of probability distributions over actions, states and types that … might arise in any Bayes Nash equilibrium where players observed additional information. We show that more information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009325804
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Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability
Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen; Takahashi, Satoru - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2010
A universal type space of interdependent expected utility preference types is constructed from higher-order preference hierarchies describing (i) an agent's (unconditional) preferences over a lottery space; (ii) the agent's preference over Anscombe-Aumann acts conditional on the unconditional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008677116