Similar Search Results

Generalized Potentials and Robust Sets of Equilibria

Morris, Stephen; Ui, Takashi - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2003

This paper introduces generalized potential functions of complete information games and studies the robustness of sets … behavior close to some equilibrium in the set. This paper provides sufficient conditions for the robustness of sets of … existing sufficient conditions for the robustness of equilibria. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762463

Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2008

A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves outcomes consistent with it. We identify a robust monotonicity condition that is necessary and (with mild extra assumptions) sufficient for robust implementation. Robust monotonicity is strictly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008545755

Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2005

A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves outcomes consistent with a social choice function. We identify a robust monotonicity condition that is necessary and (with mild extra assumptions) sufficient for robust implementation. Robust...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593322

Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2006

A social choice function is robustly implementable if there is a mechanism under which the process of iteratively eliminating strictly dominated messages leads to outcomes that agree with the social choice function for all beliefs at every type profile. In an interdependent value environment...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593452

Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2006

A social choice function is robustly implementable if there is a mechanism under which the process of iteratively eliminating strictly dominated messages leads to outcomes that agree with the social choice at every type profile. In an interdependent value environment, we identify a strict...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593470

Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005087384

Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms"

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2006

A social choice function is robustly implementable if there is a mechanism under which the process of iteratively eliminating strictly dominated messages leads to outcomes that agree with the social choice at every type profile. In an interdependent value environment with single crossing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005087399

Refinements and higher-order beliefs : a unified survey

Kajii, Atsushi; Morris, Stephen - In: The Japanese economic review : the journal of the … 71 (2020) 1, pp. 7-34

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012237230

Strict robustness to incomplete information

Morris, Stephen; Oyama, Daisuke; Takahashi, Satoru - In: The Japanese economic review : the journal of the … 74 (2023) 3, pp. 357-376

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014335890