We study how the outcomes of a private-value first price auction can vary with bidders information, for a fixed …

A single unit of a good is to be sold by auction to one of two buyers. The good has either a high value or a low value …, with known prior probabilities. The designer of the auction knows the prior over values but is uncertain about the correct … model of the buyers' beliefs. The designer evaluates a given auction design by the lowest expected revenue that would be …

We study auction design when bidders have a pure common value equal to the maximum of their independent signals. In the … equivalently be interpreted as model of resale: the bidders have independent private values at the auction stage, and the winner of … the auction can make a take-it-or-leave-it-offer in the secondary market under complete information …

is omitted from the auction. If the object is optimally sold with probability less than one, then optimal mechanisms skew … the allocation towards bidders with lower signals. This can be implemented via a modified Vickrey auction, where there is …

to be optimal among all mechanisms is that there is at least one potential bidder who is omitted from the auction. Our …