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First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Bergemann, Dirk - 2015

This paper explores the consequences of information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily correlated prior distribution over valuations, we characterize the set of possible outcomes that can arise in a Bayesian equilibrium for some information structure. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013017815

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Bergemann, Dirk - 2016

We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily correlated prior distribution over values, we characterize the lowest winning-bid distribution that can arise across all information structures and equilibria. The information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012992717

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Bergemann, Dirk - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013004045

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Bergemann, Dirk - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012982245

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Bergemann, Dirk - 2015

We explore the impact of private information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily correlated prior distribution over values, we characterize the lowest winning bid distribution that can arise across all information structures and equilibria. The information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013011350

Selling to Intermediaries : Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

Bergemann, Dirk - 2017

We characterize revenue maximizing auctions when the bidders are intermediaries who wish to resell the good. The bidders have differential information about their common resale opportunities: each bidder privately observes an independent draw of a resale opportunity, and the highest signal is a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012949875

Revenue Guarantee Equivalence

Bergemann, Dirk - 2018

We revisit the revenue comparison of standard auction formats, including first-price, second-price, and English …-price, and English auctions all have the same revenue guarantee, which is equal to that of the first-price auction as …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012918269

Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction

Bergemann, Dirk - 2013

We study how the outcomes of a private-value first price auction can vary with bidders information, for a fixed …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013072963

Countering the winner's curse : optimal auction design in a common value model

Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Ben; Morris, Stephen - 2018

to be optimal among all mechanisms is that there is at least one potential bidder who is omitted from the auction. Our …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011948704

Countering the winner's curse : optimal auction design in a common value model

Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Ben; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 4, pp. 1399-1434

is omitted from the auction. If the object is optimally sold with probability less than one, then optimal mechanisms skew … the allocation towards bidders with lower signals. This can be implemented via a modified Vickrey auction, where there is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415457